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ABSTRACT
This article will consider a possible avenue for filling 'gaps' when the 1980 Hague
Abduction Convention or the 1996 Child Protection Convention do not apply in child
custody/abduction cases. Specifically, it will explore utilizing internal US domestic rela-
tions law to facilitate the return of a child who has been abducted to the USA from a
non-signatory country. To better illustrate the potential effects, the article will explore
this 'gap filler' through the lens of a case study involving Japan, the most prominent
first world country that is not yet a signatory to the Convention. The article also con-
siders the implications for the international community.
I. INTRODUCTION
This article will consider a possible avenue for filling 'gaps' when the 1980 Hague
Abduction Convention (hereinafter 'Convention') or the 1996 Child Protection
Convention' do not apply in child custody/abduction cases where the child is ab-
ducted to the USA. Specifically, it will explore utilizing internal US domestic rela-
tions law, specifically the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act,
to facilitate the return of a child who has been abducted to the USA from a non-
signatory country. Using US law in this way should effectuate a return of a child
tantamount to a return under the Convention.
This use supports the spirit of the Convention and of the majority of US states'
laws by ensuring that the nation/jurisdiction where the child has primarily resided
( The Author 2014. Published by Oxford University Press.
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and has significant connections makes decisions concerning custody of that child.
This mechanism presents an alternative to the 'best interests' argument alone via a
jurisdictional challenge to be used by Americans and foreign nationals alike in the
USA. In effect, it prevents a 'best interests' determination in the USA from occurring
when the USA is not the appropriate forum to make this determination.
II. CASE STUDY: ILLUSTRATING THE 'GAP' PROBLEM
Perhaps the best way to explore this 'gap filler' is through the lens of a case study
involving a child abducted from Japan, the most prominent first world country that,
when this article was drafted, was not yet a signatory to the Convention,2 to the
USA. The following represents the operational facts necessary to properly frame the
issue for present purposes, albeit without personal or other identifying information.
The case involves a dual citizen female child ('Child'), aged 6 years at the time of
abduction. The child's father ('Father') is native Japanese and her mother ('Mother')
is American. Father was born and raised in western/central Honshu outside a metro-
politan area. Mother was born and raised primarily in Florida, though she spent a
brief period in central Ohio. Father and Mother met in the USA while Father was on
an extended work assignment. After a relatively short, and at times long distance,
courtship, Father and Mother married in the USA. However, within months of mar-
rying, the couple moved to Tokyo (where Father had been living and working since
1990). Sometime during 2004, Mother found out she was pregnant. The couple
decided Mother would deliver the child in Florida so she could be close to family.
Mother was in the USA making preparations when the child was born premature in
May 2005. Father flew to the USA and spent several weeks with Mother and Child.
Ultimately, the entire family returned to Japan in approximately July 2005. Other
than at least annual trips to the USA to visit Mother's family, Child had spent the
overwhelming majority of her life in Japan with her parents. Her permanent resi-
dence had always been in Japan. The child has/had extended paternal family in
Japan, attended school in Japan, and was fully integrated into her life in Japan.
Mother and Father's relationship was a tumultuous one. Retrospectively, there
were several allegations made by each parent against the other regarding physical
abuse, as well as several instances where one parent would accuse the other of with-
holding or attempting to withhold the child. In fact, at one point Mother took
Child's US passport from the family's safe and refused to return it. Due to the on-
going relational stress, and after the 2011 earthquake and ensuing tsunami, the family
relocated to live with Father's family in Japan. Upon arrival, Mother refused to reside
in Father's family's house, so Father obtained an apartment for Mother, but refused
to allow Child to spend the night with Mother or see Mother out of fear that
Mother would abscond with Child, using the passport. After several months, and
without Father's knowledge or consent, Mother succeeded, abducted the child and
fled to the USA. Mother admittedly engaged in efforts to conceal her and Child's lo-
cation after leaving Japan. Mother left no indication for Father that she left Japan or
where she was going. Mother further admitted that while she could have sent Father
an email or otherwise communicated to him or his family that she and Child were
safe, she made no such effort. After several months of searching and hiring a private
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investigator, Father ultimately learned that Mother was living with the child near
Columbus, Ohio, in the USA since mid-August 2011.
As Japan was not a signatory of the Convention,3 Father filed a series of legal pro-
ceedings in Ohio in early January 2012. While Father initially alleged that Ohio had
proper jurisdiction to make a custody determination (and arguing the court should
award custody solely to him), when Mother filed her predictable counterclaim for
custody, Father asserted an affirmative defence, using Ohio state law,4 that Ohio is
without subject matter jurisdiction to make any final custody determinations con-
cerning his child and that Japan is the only appropriate jurisdiction to do so.
Subsequently, Father instituted custody proceedings in Japan.5
At trial in Ohio, Father argued that Ohio is without subject matter jurisdiction to
determine the child's custody and requested that the Ohio Court issue an order
determining Japan to be the child's home state and permitting Father to arrange for
the child's return for further proceedings in the Japanese courts.
Ill. IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM
Under the Convention, a return of the child to Japan would have been virtually guar-
anteed so that Japan - where the child had lived the great majority of her life - could
make a custody determination. Instead, because Japan was not a signatory to the
Convention, Father was functionally left without a mechanism to bring his daughter
back, at least not without the USA actually making a determination on the merits of
the competing custody claims. In essence, the single fact that completely changes the
outcome for this family and for this child is that Japan was not a signatory to the
Convention.
The authors recognize that there are a host of policy reasons why signatory na-
tions are treated differently than non-signatory nations. However, for purposes of
this discussion, we ask that you suspend those ideas, at least for now. We ask that
you focus on the more human and moral questions that this problem presents for all
of us. Specifically, should this child and this family be treated 'differently' simply be-
cause Japan was not a signatory to the Convention? Put another way, if there is vir-
tual unanimity that, factually, this case belongs in the Japanese courts why, as a
matter of law, should that not be the result?
If we go 'back to basics' and focus on the essential purposes of the Convention
and the problems it sought to remedy, we remember that, collectively, the
Convention drafters, proponents, signatories and subsequent ratifying nations deter-
mined that it was important and necessary to keep children from being pawns in
both parental and political conflicts. If we agree that certain behaviours on the part
of a parent - ie to cross a border to gain some form of custody advantage - are in-
herently wrong, are not they wrong regardless of whether that parent left a signatory
or non-signatory nation? With all of that in mind, we query: does a legal frame-
work exist that would approximate the same result that could be obtained using
the Convention and to obtain what we have collectively determined is the
appropriate result? In the USA, we propose that the answer already exists. We be-
lieve that USA internal law can serve as a mechanism to do just that; specifically,
the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act ('UCCJEA') is
an answer.
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IV. UCCJEA: A PRIMER
The UCCJEA is a state-level jurisdictional statute that confers subject matter jurisdic-
tion by way of forum selection. It has been adopted by almost every state [49 states,
DC, Guam and the US Virgin Islands] with essentially the same language since it
was originally promulgated in 1997. In Ohio, the UCCJEA is codified in Ohio
Revised Code §3127.01-3127.53. In addition to other things, the UCCJEA deter-
mines which state has proper jurisdiction to make an initial determination of child
custody. To do that in the usual course,8 the analysis focuses on the geographic locus
of the child and the amount of time the child resided in that location to make this
determination. Once a state obtains and exercises custody jurisdiction, it maintains
exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over custody matters unless certain exceptions
apply. Even if a state obtains the right to exercise jurisdiction but has not yet exer-
cised it, it maintains super priority over any other place until it either exercises its jur-
isdiction or loses that priority. The UCCJEA provides the framework for
determination of which state may enter a child custody order; it rejects using a 'best
interests' standard in determining jurisdiction to avoid ruling on the merits of a cus-
tody dispute.9
The UCCJEA is the most recent iteration of law that has been in effect since
1968. At that time, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws promulgated the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act ('UCCJA'). The
UCCJA was subsequently adopted by all 50 states and the District of Columbia
(Blumberg, 2103). The UCCJA addressed the increased mobility of parents and the
negative results thereof, namely kidnapping of children by parents looking to re-
litigate custody determinations in a more favourable forum.'o The UCCJA sought to
accomplish the following goals: allowing only one state to exercise jurisdiction to
decide a child custody case; protect the resulting custody order from modification in
other states unless certain criteria were met; deter interstate jurisdictional competi-
tion or parental abduction; promote cooperation between courts; avoid re-litigation
of custody decisions; and assure that litigation takes place in the state with the closest
connection to the child and the best access to evidence concerning the child
(Blumberg, 2013). Unfortunately, the UCCJA left some uncertainty about two differ-
ent bases for exercising custody jurisdiction," leading to inconsistent results and
case law.
In 1980, US Congress enacted the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
('PKPA').12 The PKPA had similar purposes as the UCCJA, but was federal in
nature and preempted any conflicting state law. The PKPA also differed slightly
from the UCCJA in the following ways: emphasizing the priority of where the child
had resided for the six months preceding the filing of the custody action and empha-
sizing that jurisdiction's exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over custody.13 In light of
the PKPA and almost 30 years of inconsistent case law under the UCCJA, the
UCCJEA was promulgated in 1997.14 The UCCJEA intended to reconcile the
UCCJA with the PKPA, especially by emphasizing the priority of the child's 'home
state'. The UCCJA's two sources of potential initial custody jurisdiction were refined,
clarified, and, in fact, reordered. In the end, the child's 'home state' has super
priority.
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V. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE UCCJEA AND THE CONVENTION
The UCCJEA and the Convention share similar purposes and policy goals. The
UCCJEA seeks to avoid jurisdictional conflict and competition, to deter abductions
of children, and to prevent forum shopping.'s As detailed by its history above, the
UCCJEA has evolved to address custody jurisdiction forum issues in an increasingly
mobile society. Similarly, the Convention was expressly designed to protect children
from the harmful effects of their wrongful removal by establishing procedures to en-
sure the child's prompt return. To achieve this, the Convention seeks to deter ab-
ductions of children' 7 and its fundamental purpose is to deter parents from engaging
in forum shopping and to prevent parents from securing an advantage in an antici-
pated or actual custody dispute by crossing international borders in search of a more
sympathetic court.' 8 The underlying purposes and policies of the UCCJEA and the
Convention are remarkably similar and simple: both seek to minimize and deter jur-
isdictional conflict for the child's benefit.
For both the UCCJEA and the Convention, the pivotal determination concerning
where a custody matter should be decided focuses on geographic locus and time.
The UCCJEA puts great emphasis on the geographic location where the child has
resided for a sufficient period of time prior to the filing of a custody action. The
UCCJEA provides four types of initial jurisdiction.' 9 The first and most important
type of initial jurisdiction is 'home state' jurisdiction. The term 'home state' is
defined as 'the state in which a child lived with a parent... for at least six consecutive
months immediately preceding the commencement of a child custody proceeding
and, if a child is less than six months old, the state in which the child lived from
birth...'.2o If there is a 'home state' of a child or if there was a home state of the child
within six months before the commencement of the proceeding, that place is the ap-
propriate jurisdiction to make an initial custody determination concerning that
child; 21 all other types of jurisdiction only apply if a 'home state' has declined to ex-
ercise that jurisdiction or the child does not have a 'home state'. By focusing on
where the child has resided for a period of time, the UCCJEA seeks to ensure that
the state/place with optimum access to relevant facts and information about the
child makes the custody determination.22
Similarly, the Convention's core concern is the child's 'habitual residence', and
the overwhelming remainder of issues in a Convention case revolve around that nu-
cleus. While the term 'habitual residence' is not formally defined in the Convention
or elsewhere, it is a fact-intensive determination that considers geographic location
and the passage of time.24 US case law has described 'habitual residence' to include:
the change of geography/geographic location; the passage of time in a particular lo-
cation; evidence of a significant connection with a particular place; and considering
these issues of connection through the viewpoint of the child.2 - The Convention
also relies on the presumption that a child's best interest is served by the court with
optimum access to information and evidence about the child and his/her life.2 The
definition of 'habitual residence', then, is directly shaped by the overarching goals of
the Convention. The authors recognize that 'habitual residence' and 'home state' are
not one and the same. The definition of 'home state' is more formulaic and precise,
relying on where the child has lived for a specifically prescribed period of time.27
'Habitual residence' is a fact-intensive determination that relies on more subjective
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concepts.2 8 Despite some differences, both terms share the same conceptual core;
both seek to determine which jurisdiction has the greatest connection to the child at
issue by focusing on the intersection between geographic location and time spent in
said location.
Both the UCCJEA and the Convention emphasize the importance of exclusive
jurisdiction over custody matters. Under the UCCJEA, the state/place that exercises
appropriate custody jurisdiction - often the child's 'home state' - maintains exclu-
sive, continuing jurisdiction over custody matters unless specific exceptions apply.2 9
The Convention also envisions that the courts of a country exercising appropriate
jurisdiction (the child's 'habitual residence') has exclusive jurisdiction over child
custody.
VI. UCCJEA: APPLICABILITY TO THE INTERNATIONAL SCENE
So, one might ask: How does the UCCJEA - which deals with forum determination
between United States' states - have any bearing on the international community?
The UCCJEA answers that question through its text: foreign nations are treated as
'states' under the UCCJEA.30 One of the primary tenets of statutory construction in
the USA is that the plain, unambiguous text of a statute should be conclusive.3 ' The
language of the UCCJEA unambiguously declares that foreign nations shall be
treated as states, showing a clear legislative intent that the principles of the UCCJEA
should apply in international border-crossing situations. The plain text by itself is
conclusive; one can only conclude that the legislative body contemplated the
UCCJEA's application in international abduction cases. Moreover, the Comments to
the model UCCJEA promulgated in 1997 clearly indicate that the UCCJEA will have
international application.3 2 The express language of the statute confirms the inten-
tion to treat the UCCJEA as an analogue to the Convention - and the intention that
the UCCJEA be used in international border-crossing scenarios.
VII. 'UNJUSTIFIABLE CONDUCT'
The UCCJEA contains a provision that states that if a court has jurisdiction because
a person seeking to evoke its jurisdiction has engaged in 'unjustifiable conduct', the
court shall decline to exercise its jurisdiction unless specific exceptions apply.
'Unjustifiable conduct' is defined as 'conduct by a parent or that parent's surrogate
that attempts to create jurisdiction in this state by removing the child from the
child's home state, secreting the child, retaining the child, or restraining or otherwise
preventing the child from returning to the child's home state in order to prevent the
other parent from commencing a child custody proceeding in the child's home
state'.3 3 The unjustifiable conduct provision construed together with home state pri-
oritization is intended to prevent parents from abducting their children or engaging
in reprehensible conduct such as removing, secreting, retaining, or restraining chil-
dren in order to establish jurisdiction.3 4 The Comments to section 208 of the model
UCCJEA state that the focus of the section is the conduct of the parent in question
and that abducting parents will not receive an advantage for their conduct,3 5 showing
legislative intent concerned with the wrongful conduct of the abducting parent and
with preventing said parent from being rewarded.
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This language in the UCCJEA is strikingly similar to the language of the
Convention, which seeks to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully
removed to, or retained in, any Contracting State.3 6 The Convention defines 'wrong-
ful' as a breach of custody rights under the laws of the child's habitual residence im-
mediately before the removal or retention.3 7 The Convention does not require mens
rea; the removal or retention may be wrongful even if the party is unaware of the ex-
istence of custody rights of the other party. However, the Convention does focus on
the conduct and actions of the removing parent. If that conduct constitutes a wrong-
ful removal or retention, it cannot stand. The removing/retaining parent cannot
benefit from his/her actions. The 'unjustifiable conduct' provision in the UCCJEA
echoes the Convention with a focus on the following: wrongful removal/retention
should not be rewarded, forum shopping should be deterred, and the child's status
quo should be maintained.
VIII. HOW CAN THIS BE USED TO APPROXIMATE A RETURN UNDER
THE CONVENTION?
The UCCJEA does not expressly provide that a court has the power to order the re-
turn of a child to that child's 'home state'; however, we believe that the UCCJEA
does assert an implied power to order a child's return. When several sections of the
UCCJEA are read in concert with one another and against the backdrop of the pur-
pose and policies underlying the Act, those sections clearly create authority courts
must possess to remedy identified problems. The UCCJEA states that a court 'may
fashion an appropriate remedy to ensure the safety of a child and prevent the repeti-
tion of conduct, including staying the proceeding until a child custody proceeding is
commenced in a court having jurisdiction'.3 8 The plain language of this text - safety
of a child and prevent the repetition of conduct - was specifically chosen to echo the
language surrounding the Convention. Given all of the similarities between the
UCCJEA and the Convention, an order to return a child to his/her 'home state' is
an appropriate remedy to ensure the safety of that child and prevent the repetition of
the removing parent's conduct.3 9
While a non-'home state' court does not have jurisdiction to determine the merits
of a custody determination, that court is not completely powerless. The UCCJEA ex-
pressly gives a court power to 'fashion an appropriate remedy' to ensure the child's
safety and to prevent repetition of the abducting parent's conduct. This shows an in-
tention to give the non-'home state' court the power to issue orders concerning the
parties and the child, specifically orders focused on redirecting the custody determin-
ation back to the appropriate forum and not rewarding the actions of the abducting
parent. Moreover, the statute's use of the language - 'fashion an appropriate remedy'
- suggests the non-'home state' court is given broad power and discretion to deter-
mine what remedy is appropriate and how it should be implemented. The statute it-
self chooses not to define the terms 'appropriate remedy'; the absence of a definition
of this phrase cedes the authority to make this determination to the court based on
the factual circumstances presented. In addition, nothing in the statute expressly lim-
its what 'appropriate remedy' can include. While no formal definition is provided,
the Comments to section 208 of the model UCCJEA state that 'it would be
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appropriate [when a court declines to exercise jurisdiction] to notify the other parent
and to provide for foster care for the child until the child is returned to the other par-
ent'0 (emphasis added). These Comments show that the broad authority granted to
the non-'home state' court includes the power to return the child to the left-behind
parent. The intention to provide the non-'home state' with broad discretion under
these circumstances is consistent with the other provisions of the UCCJEA (and
how they have been interpreted and applied), including provisions emphasizing the
exclusive jurisdiction of the child's 'home state' and declining jurisdiction when one
parent has engaged in 'unjustifiable conduct'.
The non-'home state' court can issue orders concerning the parties and the child
- just not orders that make a determination about the merits of the custody deter-
mination. We believe that this includes the ability to issue an order returning the
child to his or her 'home state'. It should also include issuing orders concerning the
mechanics of the return, including the ability to issue an order that the abducted-
from parent can transport the child back to his or her 'home state'. This is the appro-
priate application of the law, entirely consistent with intent of the original drafters of
the UCCJEA4 Even if one does not believe that the court's power is that affirma-
tive, the court could issue orders stating that the abducting parent cannot interfere
with the other parent transporting the child back to his/her 'home state' (ie putting
the child on a plane).
We recognize that this position faces some criticisms and counterarguments. We
will address a few of these potential criticisms here with the goal of furthering the on-
going discussion about these issues. First, using the UCCJEA to effectuate a return
similar to the Convention does not consider the argument that courts should evalu-
ate the legal system of the nation it is returning the child to. A version of this argu-
ment is set forth in Morley (2013) where he emphasizes the importance of US
courts evaluating the legal system of foreign nations to determine whether a custody
order will be recognized and/or enforced in said foreign nation. He asserts that while
courts are often reluctant to engage in this evaluation, it is a critical assessment.
Morley also reminds us that the UCCJEA is an unusual statute when considered
from a global perspective; most 'foreign countries do not have laws that parallel the
UCCJEA's rules concerning recognition, registration and enforcement of foreign cus-
tody orders'. Instead, nations may have laws that permit modification of a foreign
custody order or do not require its enforcement at all. He also argues the importance
of assessing the actual operation of the foreign legal system in question, considering
things like speed, presumptions, or deference to its own citizens over that of foreign-
born parents.
That article makes many important points and raises thought-provoking ques-
tions; however, it is limited to cases concerning a child's proposed visit to a foreign
country or a child's international relocation. In essence, it involves prospective travel
to a foreign nation. It involves considering whether a child should be permitted to
travel and planning how said travel should be accomplished, if at all. In contrast, our
contemplated scenario involves a remedial measure - a child has already been ab-
ducted from another nation to the USA. The 'wrong' has already been done as
defined by our public policy. The legal system of the nation where the child should
be returned is irrelevant (with some limited exceptions as set forth below). For a US
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court to engage in a qualitative valuation of another country's legal system under
these circumstances would go against the clear purposes of both the Convention and
the UCCJEA. Both emphasize that the jurisdiction where a child has spent a signifi-
cant portion of his/her life - focusing on geography and time - is the appropriate
jurisdiction to make a custody determination. Additionally, both seek to deter abduc-
tion and eliminate one parent's ability to gain a custody advantage through 'bad'
behaviour. For a US court to evaluate the legal system of a foreign nation prior to
effectuating a return, with some limited exceptions, would allow the abducting parent
to get a 'pass' for his/her wrongful behaviour simply because that particular court
finds fault with the child's 'home state's' legal system.
As stated above, we recognize that both the Convention and the UCCJEA have
specific exceptions that address situations where a child cannot be returned to his/
her 'home state' or habitual residence safely (ie returning the child to known vio-
lence, war, etc.).42 We argue that those same exceptions should apply when using the
UCCJEA to effectuate a return as if under the Convention and are appropriate con-
siderations; however, those exceptions address the actual environment where the child
is being returned and whether that child's return can be accomplished without ser-
iously compromising his/her safety. While political or national considerations may
factor into this assessment, they are not conclusive. The environment to where that
child is being returned requires a focus on the specific circumstances of that child,
including but not limited to his/her local community within that nation, his/her fam-
ily, etc. This evaluation is very different than a qualitative evaluation of the legal sys-
tem of that foreign nation. An assessment of the substance of a nation's legal system
does not fit into the specific exceptions contemplated by Articles 13(b) and 20 of
the Convention. It should not be relevant in addressing and remedying a remedial
situation where a child has already been wrongfully abducted to the USA.
Another potential criticism of the position of this article is the argument that the
UCCJEA should not be applicable if the foreign nation in question does not have
laws in conformity with the UCCJEA. One simple answer to this critique is to point
out that nothing in the statute itself requires that the home state have an analogue to
the UCCJEA in place in order for the UCCJEA to apply; the UCCJEA simply defers
to the super-priority of the 'home state'. Additionally, as Morley (2013) points out,
the UCCJEA is more the exception than the rule in the international arena. Refusing
to return a child to his/her 'home state' because that 'home state's' legal system does
not have an internal law comparable to the UCCJEA - which few nations, if any, do
- would contradict the spirit of the Act as well as potentially reward an abducting
parent. The authors recognize that the model UCCJEA promulgated in 1997 does
state that 'a child-custody determination made in a foreign country under factual cir-
cumstances in substantial conformity with the jurisdictional standards of this [Act]
must be recognized and enforced under [Article] 3'.43 Most often, this argument is
discussed in the context of enforcing foreign orders (ie whether to enforce a foreign
order from a nation that does not have substantial compliance with the UCCJEA);
however, the position set forth in this article focuses on situations in which no cus-
tody order from any jurisdiction has been issued.
Our focus has admittedly been initial custody determinations where no court
orders have been issued concerning the child in question - meaning that no court
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has yet invoked custody jurisdiction over the child. The fact pattern we use to illus-
trate our argument is just that situation. If we extend our argument to circumstances
where a prior court order already exists, we believe that the UCCJEA can still be
used to obtain a result consistent with US public policy. Specifically, if a prior foreign
court order concerning custody already exists, that court has already exercised cus-
tody jurisdiction over the child. Its continuing, exclusive jurisdiction should remain
in effect unless the specific exceptions of the UCCJEA apply. The US court would
not have subject matter jurisdiction over the matter; it could use the UCCJEA to de-
cline custody jurisdiction, thereby deferring to the jurisdiction of the 'home state'. So
long as the US court is not being asked to enforce the prior court order, it does not
need to address or consider whether that foreign nation is substantially compliant
with the UCCJEA. Instead, if the issuing jurisdiction was the 'home state' of the
child, the US court is without subject matter jurisdiction. Unless the US court must
take emergency custody jurisdiction" or the 'home state' court has relinquished jur-
isdiction, the analysis ends when the court determines it does not have subject mat-
ter jurisdiction. The US court can then issue any necessary orders to defer to the
'home state'.
We acknowledge that this legal theory is not yet a 'finished product'. However, it
is a defensible idea that should work. It is a theory that requires a reasonable - and
not excessive - extension of existing internal US law, the UCCJEA. The purposes,
policies, and text of the UCCJEA and the Convention are so similar that effectuating
a return to the child's 'home state' is a logical extension of the express provisions of
the UCCJEA. It is the correct application of existing law and is how the UCCJEA
was intended to be applied when a child has been abducted to the USA.45
IX. APPLIED TO THE CASE STUDY
In order to understand how the theory could be applied, we return to the case study
presented earlier. Under that fact pattern, Japan - not Ohio - is the 'home state' of
the child for purposes of the UCCJEA. To determine the child's 'home state', the
proper inquiry is whether the child has resided in a state for a period of six consecu-
tive months prior to the commencement of a child custody proceeding.46
Furthermore, and most importantly, pursuant to the express terms of the UCCJEA,
Ohio courts must consider foreign nations as 'states' for purposes of the UCCJEA4 7
In the instant matter, the child had not resided in Ohio for 6 months when the cus-
tody action was filed in the Ohio court. Moreover, the salient facts confirmed that
the child had spent the great majority of her life in Japan, had family in Japan, and
virtually all information regarding the child - ie her medical/dental records, educa-
tional information, etc. - existed only in Japan. The child's best interest is served by
having the court with optimum access to information and evidence about the child
and her life make the custody determination.
Because Japan, not Ohio, is the child's 'home state', the Japanese court has exclu-
sive jurisdictional priority over any custody issues regarding the minor child. The
Ohio court lacks any jurisdiction over the substantive issue of the child's custody48 and
therefore must defer any determination on that issue to the Japanese courts. No evi-
dence was presented - nor any representation that any such evidence could ever be
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presented - that Japan has ever declined to exercise jurisdiction. In fact, Father had
instituted custody proceedings in Japan. Even if Ohio had custody jurisdiction under
the UCCJEA, Mother had engaged in 'unjustifiable conduct', so the Ohio court must
decline to exercise jurisdiction. Mother admitted that she secretly removed the child
from Japan without the consent of Father, withheld the child's whereabouts from
Father for several months, and admitted at deposition and at trial that by doing these
things she was attempting to artificially establish jurisdiction in this state in order to
file for divorce and obtain custody of the child with no interference from her hus-
band. She clearly engaged in 'conduct... that attempt[ed] to create jurisdiction in
this state by removing the child from the child's home state, secreting the child, re-
taining the child,... and otherwise preventing the child from returning to the child's
home state in order to prevent the other parent from commencing a child custody'.
As a result, Ohio cannot reward her conduct and must affirmatively decline to exer-
cise jurisdiction.
While the Ohio court is devoid of custody jurisdiction and cannot issue orders on
the merits, it still has the power to 'fashion an appropriate remedy to ensure the
safety of a child and prevent the repetition of Mother's conduct. The Ohio court
should issue orders to effectuate the return of the child to Japan so that the Japanese
court can exercise custody jurisdiction over the child. This return would be the most
'appropriate remedy' under the circumstances; it would return the child to her status
quo and to her life in Japan. The Ohio court can use its authority to fashion that rem-
edy and issue orders allowing Father to travel with the child back to Japan, preferably
affirmative orders ordering the return. Alternatively, the Ohio court can issue orders
stating that Mother cannot interfere with Father's ability to return to Japan with the
child. The mere fact that the Convention did not directly apply does not mean that
the law and public policy of both Ohio and the USA are irrelevant and/or not con-
trolling. Instead, both Ohio and US law and express public policy (ie the Convention
and UCCJEA) demand that the child be returned to her rightful home of Japan so
any issue regarding her custody can be addressed by the courts best suited to make
such a determination - and her return must happen regardless of whatever legal
mechanism is utilized, or however that return is packaged.
X. CONCLUSION: APPLICABILITY FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
The solution proposed in this article provides a mechanism to address and remedy a
scenario when a child has been abducted to the USA form a nation that is not a sig-
natory to the Convention. It suggests using internal US law to effectuate a return
similar to a return via the Convention, arguing that the abducting parent should not
be rewarded for his/her wrongful behaviour simply because he/she came from a na-
tion that is not yet a signatory. The fact pattern presented involves Japan, which was
not a signatory to the Convention at the time these events unfolded despite its status
as a member of the 'first world' and a highly developed nation. While Japan was in
the process of becoming a signatory at the time this article was being written, this
fact pattern is not limited to Japan. It is important to consider that the world is not a
static place. Many non-signatory nations are developing rapidly - and their signing
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of the Convention lags behind that development. It is only a matter of time before a
parent from another developed/developing nation (which has not yet signed the
Convention) finds himself/herself in a similar situation, trying to find a legal mech-
anism to remedy an abduction of a child to the USA
Arguably, even if a child is abducted to the USA from a signatory nation, the left
behind parent could simultaneously use both the existing Convention process and a
state court process under the UCCJEA if a stay is not immediately recognized in
state court.49 While the Convention requires an automatic stay of the US court's cus-
tody proceeding once a Convention case has commenced, using the UCCJEA to bol-
ster the left-behind parent's arguments and may assist the state court in staying its
proceedings more quickly.
Using the UCCJEA to effectuate a return of a child supports the spirit of the
Convention and of US law by ensuring that the nation/jurisdiction where the child
has primarily resided and has significant connections should make decisions concern-
ing custody of that child. This mechanism provides a jurisdictional challenge to be
used by Americans and foreign nationals alike in the USA- It applies to existing US
law appropriately and correctly; it uses internal law in a manner consistent with
stated purposes and policies. Most importantly, it presents a legal avenue to remedy
the abduction of a child to the USA and to ensure that an abducting parent's wrong-
ful conduct is not rewarded simply because he/she came from a non-signatory na-
tion. It is a potential solution to a very glaring 'gap' in the existing legal structure
concerning child abduction.
NOTES
1. The USA signed the 1980 Child Abduction Convention on 23 December 1981 and ratified
the same on 29 April 1988. The 1980 Convention entered into force with regard to the
USA on 1 July 1988. The USA also signed the 1996 Child Protection Convention on 22
October 2010 but has not ratified it. See www.hcch.net
2. However, Japan signed and ratified the 1980 Convention on 24 January 2014, with the
Convention entering into force 1 April 2014. See http://www.hcch.net/index en.php?act=
conventions.status&cid=24.
3. All parties in the Ohio litigation agree that if Japan had been subject to the Convention in
January 2012, the case would have functionally been over before it started and the child
would have been immediately returned to her habitual residence in Japan.
4. Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, codified in Ohio Revised Code
Chapter 3127.01 et seq.
5. Father filed for divorce in Japan in June 2012. It is worth noting that due to Father's particu-
lar religious beliefs, he struggled with the decision to divorce his wife.
6. The Ohio magistrate erroneously found that Ohio had proper subject matter jurisdiction
and awarding custody to Mother. Father has objected to the decision.
7. See http://aw.unh.libguides.com/nhfamilylaw. The UCCJEA superseded the UCCJA which
had been in effect since the 1960s and sought to further create a seamless system by rectify-
ing some of the problems with its predecessor, including those which were attempted to be
rectified via the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (Pub. L. 96-611, 94 Stat. 3573,
enacted 28 December 1980, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A). See further, infra.
8. There are outlier situations, such as very young children, emergencies involving an abused
or neglected child, or where no place actually qualifies as the undisputed best location to de-
termine custody, but these are largely irrelevant to the instant discussion.
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9. Hensley v. Kanizai, Ala.Civ.App. No. 2120459, 2013 Ala.Civ.App. LEXIS 165 (26 July 2013);
Brandt v. Brandt, 2012 CO 3, 268 P.3d 406 (2012).
10. Toland v. Futagi, 425 Md. 365, 40 A3d 1051 (2012).
11. The UCCJA provided for two kinds of initial custody jurisdiction: 'home state' jurisdiction
and 'significant connection' jurisdiction.
12. 28 U.S.C. 1738A
13. See 28 U.S.C. 91738A(c)(2) (A).
14. Toland v. Futagi, 425 Md. 365.
15. Upson v. Wallace, 3 A.3d 1148 (D.C. 2010); Mulatu v. Grisha, No. CA2011-07-051, 2011-
Ohio-6226; In re Lewin, 149 S.W.3d 727 (Tex.2004).
16. Abdollah Naghash Souratgar v. Fail, 720 F.3d 96 (2nd Cir. 2013).
17. Barzilay v. Barzilay, 600 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2010).
18. Redmond v. Redmond, 724 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 2013); Hofman v. Sender, 716 F.3d 282 (2nd
Cir. 2013); Selo v. Selo, 929 F. Supp. 2d 718 (E.D. Mich. 2013).
19. See In Re J.E., No. 97116, 2012-Ohio-704 citing Rosen v. Celebrezze, 117 Ohio St.3d 241,
2008-Ohio-853, 883 N.E.2d 420.
20. O.R.C. 3127.01(B)(7).
21. O.R.C. §3127.15(A).
22. State ex rel Morenz v. Kerr, 104 Ohio St.3d 148, 2004-Ohio-6208, 818 N.E.2d 1162.
23. Guzzo v. Cristofano, 719 F.3d 100 (2nd Cir. 2013).
24. See Atkinson (2011: 648-9). In some borderline cases, policy considerations have also been
considered in determining 'habitual residence': see Shuz (2001).
25. Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396 (6th Cir. 1993); Pasten v. Velasquez, 462 F. Supp. 2d
1206 (N.D. Ala. 2006); Atkinson, The Meaning of Habitual Residence Under the Hague
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction and the Hague Convention on
the Protection of Children at 650-7.
26. Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 176 L.Ed.2d. 789 (2010); White v. White, 718
F.3d 300 (4th Cir. 2013); Barzilay v. Barzilay, 600 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2010).
27. Atkinson (2011: 658-60).
28. Ibid.
29. O.R.C. 3127.16; said court maintains exclusive jurisdiction 'until the court or a court of an-
other state determines that the child, the child's parents, and any person acting as a parent
do not presently reside in this state'.
30. O.RC. 3127.04.
31. We begin with the familiar canon of statutory construction that the starting point for
interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself. Absent a clearly expressed le-
gislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclu-
sive: Consumer Product Safety Commission et al. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. et al., 447 U.S.
102, 100 S. Ct. 2051, 64 L.Ed.2d. 766 (1980). '[I]n interpreting a statute a court
should always turn to one cardinal canon before all others... [C]ourts must presume
that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says
there.' Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 112 S. Ct. 1146, 117 L.Ed.2d.
391 (1992). Indeed, 'when the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first
canon is also the last: "judicial inquiry is complete"'.
32. Comments to Section 105 of the model UCCJEA, drafted by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (1997) states that '[tihe provisions of this Act have
international application to child custody proceedings and determinations of other countries.
Another country will be treated as if it were a State of the United States for purposes of
applying Articles I and 2 of this Act'.
33. O.R.C. 3127.22(D).
34. In re the Parental Responsibilities of L.S., 257 P.3d.201 (Colo. 2011).
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35. Comments to Section 208 of the UCCJEA, drafted by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (1997).
36. Article I(a) of the Hague Convention.
37. Article III of the Hague Convention.
38. O.R.C.3127.22(B).
39. The US Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, International Parental Child
Abduction section compares the Convention and the UCCJEA and offers them as remedies
in child abduction scenarios on its website, http://travel.state.gov/content/childabduction/
english/to/getting-your-custody-order-recognized-enforced-in-the-u-s.html.
40. Comments to Section 208 of the UCCJEA, drafted by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (1997).
41. Ibid.
42. Article 13(b) of the Hague Convention which does not require return if 'there is grave risk
that the child's return would expose the child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise
place the child in an intolerable situation'; Article 20 of the Hague Convention also does not
require return if that return of the child would subject the child to violation of basic human
rights and fundamental freedoms. The UCCJEA provides for temporary emergency custody
jurisdiction when it is 'necessary to protect the child' who is threatened with or subjected to
abuse. O.R.C. 3127.18(A). Moreover, Section 105(c) of the model UCCJEA states that '[a]
court of this State need not apply this [Act] if the child custody law of a foreign country vio-
lates fundamental principles of human rights'.
43. Section 105 of the UCCJEA, drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (1997).
44. See O.R.C. 3127.18; in the case of emergency temporary custody jurisdiction, said court
may take jurisdiction temporarily until the home state can take action.
45. Comments to Section 208 of the UCCJEA, drafted by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (1997).
46. See In Re J.E., supra; Mulatu v. Girsha, No. CA2011-07-051, 2011-Ohio-6226; and Burnett v.
Dewey, No. S-11-021, 2011-Ohio-4678.
47. See also, eg, Ogawa v. Ogawa, 125 Nev. 660, 57 A.L.R.6th 711, 125 Nev. Adv. Rep. SI
(2009) (holding that the UCCJEA considers foreign nations as states).
48. It is important to note that simply because this Court lacks jurisdiction to enter an initial de-
termination does not mean this Court is powerless to act in any capacity. See further discus-
sion, infra.
49. Pendency of a Petition for return under the Convention in any US court requires that state
court custody proceedings be stayed. See Note 10, Article 16 of the Convention; Yang v.
Tsui, 416 F.3d 199, 2013 (3rd Cir. 2005).
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